LSB steganography with improved embedding efficiency and undetectability by Khalind, Omed & Aziz, Benjamin Yowell Yousif
 David C. Wyld et al. (Eds) : ITCS, CST, JSE, SIP, ARIA, DMS - 2015  
pp. 89–105, 2015. © CS & IT-CSCP 2015                                                       DOI : 10.5121/csit.2015.50110 
 
LSB STEGANOGRAPHY WITH IMPROVED 
EMBEDDING EFFICIENCY AND 
UNDETECTABILITY 
 
Omed Khalind and Benjamin Aziz 
  
School of Computing, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom 
Omed.khalind@port.ac.uk, Benjamin.Aziz@port.ac.uk 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 
In this paper, we propose a new method of non-adaptive LSB steganography in still images to 
improve the embedding efficiency from 2 to 8/3 random bits per one embedding change even for 
the embedding rate of 1 bit per pixel. The method takes 2-bits of the secret message at a time 
and compares them to the LSBs of the two chosen pixel values for embedding, it always assumes 
a single mismatch between the two and uses the second LSB of the first pixel value to hold the 
index of the mismatch. It is shown that the proposed method outperforms the security of LSB 
replacement, LSB matching, and LSB matching revisited by reducing the probability of 
detection with their current targeted steganalysis methods. Other advantages of the proposed 
method are reducing the overall bit-level changes to the cover image for the same amount of 
embedded data and avoiding complex calculations. Finally, the new method results in little 
additional distortion in the stego image, which could be tolerated. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Steganography is the art and the science of keeping the existence of messages secret rather than 
only their contents, as it is the case with cryptography. Both steganography and digital 
watermarking belong to information hiding, but they differ in their purpose. Digital watermarking 
is intended to protect the cover, whereas steganography is used to protect the message. So, 
steganography is considered broken when the existence of the secret message is detected. Hence, 
the most important property for every steganographic method is undetectability by the existing 
steganalysis techniques. 
 
LSB steganography is the most widely used embedding method in pixel domain, since it is easy 
to implement, has reasonable capacity, and is visually imperceptible. Unfortunately, both methods 
of LSB steganography (LSB replacement and LSB matching) are detectable by the current 
steganalysis approaches discussed in later sections. 
 
There are some methods proposed to improve the capacity of LSB replacement like[1,2], or to 
avoid changing the histogram of the cover image like [3] which reduce the embedding capacity 
by 50%. As mentioned earlier, the undetectability, or the probability of detection is the most 
important property for any steganographic method. In this paper a new method of non-adaptive 
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LSB steganography is proposed to reduce the probability of detection for the same amount of data 
embedded with LSB replacement, LSB matching, and LSB matching revisited [4]by the current  
detection methods. The proposed method also results in fewer ENMPP (Expected Number of 
Modifications Per Pixel) in both pixel and bit-level to the cover image, and changes the histogram 
of the cover image in a different way without any complex calculation. 
 
The paper is organized like the following; it starts with clarifying adaptive and non-adaptive 
steganography and the related embedding methods in the literature. Then, it starts analysing both 
LSB replacement and LSB matching in grey-scale images from different perspectives such as the 
embedding efficiency, histogram changes, and bit-level ENMPP. Then, the proposed method is 
explained and followed by the same analysis process. After that, the experimental results are 
shown for the proposed method against both steganalysis methods; LSB replacement and LSB 
matching. Finally, the conclusion and future work are discussed in the last section. 
 
2. ADAPTIVE AND NON-ADAPTIVE LSB STEGANOGRAPHY IN IMAGE 
 
The embedding process of LSB steganography relies on some methods for selecting the location 
of the change. In general, there are three selection rules to follow in order to control the location 
of change, which are either sequential, random, or adaptive [5]. 
 
A sequential selection rule modifies the cover object elements individually by embedding the 
secret message bits in a sequential way. For example, it is possible to embed the secret message 
by starting from the top-left corner of an image to the bottom-right corner in a row-wise manner. 
This selection rule, sequential, is very easy to implement, but has a very low security against 
detection methods. 
 
A pseudo-random selection rule modifies the cover object by embedding the secret message bits 
into a pseudo randomly chosen subset of the cover object, possibly by using a secret key as a 
pseudo-random number generator (PRNG). This type of selection rule gives a higher level of 
security than sequential methods. 
 
An adaptive selection rule modifies the cover object by embedding the secret message bits in 
selected locations based on the characteristics of the cover object. For example, choosing noisy 
and high textured areas of the image, which are less detectable than smooth areas for hiding data. 
This selection rule, adaptive, gives a higher security than sequential and pseudo-random selection 
rules in terms of detection. 
 
So, the non-adaptive image steganography techniques are modifying the cover image for message 
embedding without considering its features (content). For example LSB replacement and LSB 
matching with sequential or random selection of pixels are modifying the cover image according 
to the secret message and the key of random selection of pixels without taking the cover image 
properties into account. Whereas, adaptive image steganography techniques are modify the cover 
image in correlation with its features [6]. In other words, the selection of pixel positions for 
embedding is adaptive depending on the content of the cover image. The bit-plane complexity 
segmentation (BPCS) proposed by Kawguchi[7] is an early typical method of adaptive 
steganography. 
 
As adaptive steganographic schemes embed data in specific regions (such as edges), the 
steganographic capacity of such method is highly depend on the cover image used for embedding. 
Therefore, in general it is expected to have less embedding rate than non-adaptive schemes. 
However, steganographers have to pay this price in order to have a better security or less 
detectable stego image.  
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3. RELATED WORKS 
 
The undetectability is the most important requirement of any steganographic scheme, which is 
affected by the choice of the cover object, the type of embedding method, the selection rule of 
modifying places, and the number of embedding changes which is directly related to the length of 
secret message[8]. 
 
If two different embedding methods share the same source of cover objects, the same selection 
method of embedding place, and the same embedding operation, the one with less number of 
embedding changes will be more secure (less detectable). This is because the statistical property 
of the cover object is less likely to be disrupted by smaller number of embedding changes[8]. 
The concept of embedding efficiency is introduced by westfeld[9], and then considered as an 
important feature of steganographic schemes[10,11], which is the expected number of embedded 
random message bits per single embedding change[12]. 
 
Reducing the expected number of modifications per pixel (ENMPP) is well studied in the 
literature considering the embedding rate of less than 1 , like westfeld’s F5-algorithm[13], which 
could increase the embedding efficiency only for short messages. However, short messages are 
already challenging to detect. Also, the source coding-based steganography (matrix embedding) 
proposed by Fridrich et al.[8,12], which are extensions of F5-algorithm improved the embedding 
efficiency for large payloads but still with embedding rate of less than 1. The stochastic 
modulation proposed by Fridrich and Goljan[14], is  another method of improving the security for 
the embedding rate of up to 0.8 bits/ pixel. 
 
For the embedding rate of 1, there have been some methods for improving the embedding 
efficiency of LSB matching like Mielikainen[4], which reduced the ENMPP with the same 
message length from 0.5 to 0.375. The choice of whether to add or subtract one to/from a pixel 
value of their method relies on both the original pixel values and a pair of two consecutive secret 
bits. However, this method of embedding cannot be applied on saturated pixels (i.e. pixels with 
values 0 and 255), which is one of the drawbacks of this method. Then, the generalization method 
of LSB matching is proposed by Li et al.[15] with the same ENMPP for the same embedding rate 
using sum and difference covering set (SDCS). Another method of improving the embedding 
efficiency of LSB matching is proposed by Zhang et al.[16], using a combination of binary codes 
and wet paper codes, The embedding efficiency of this method can achieve the upper bound of 
the generalized ±1 embedding schemes. 
 
However, no method could be found in the literature to improve the embedding efficiency of non-
adaptive LSB replacement, which is 2 bits per embedding change, for the embedding rate of 1. 
So, developing such a method could be more useful than other adaptive methods in reusability 
perspective. Moreover, the non-adaptive LSB embedding methods with higher embedding 
efficiency can be used by existing adapted embedding methods to improve the steganographic 
capacity and reduce the probability of detection. A good example is the LSB matching 
revisited[4], which has been extended by[17,19]. 
 
Also, moving from non-adaptive to adaptive LSB embedding method does not mean that 
improving the non-adaptive methods are impossible or useless, as we mentioned earlier, the LSB 
matching revisited[4] is a very good example to support this fact. 
 
4. ANALYSIS OF LSB REPLACEMENT 
 
In this section, LSB replacement is analysed in three perspectives; the embedding process itself 
(with its embedding efficiency), its effect on the intensity histogram after embedding process, and 
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the bit-level ENMPP for each bit of the secret message. Also, the main weaknesses of this 
embedding method are highlighted with the steganalysis methods that can detect it. 
 
LSB replacement steganography simply replaces the LSB of the cover image pixel value with the 
value of a single bit of the secret message. It leaves the pixel values unchanged when their LSB 
value matches the bit value of the secret message and changes the mismatched LSB by either 
incrementing or decrementing the even or odd pixel values by one respectively[4], as shown in 
Figure 1. 
  
 
 
Figure1. Possible pixel value transitions with LSB replacement 
 
The embedding algorithm of the LSB replacement can be formally described as follows: 
 
 =  + 1    , 
  ≠     
  − 1    , 
  ≠     
             , 
  =                               
 
To analyse the influence of the LSB replacement on the cover image intensity histogram, we 
should consider that there is a probability of 50% for the LSB of the cover image pixel value to 
already have the desired bit value. Therefore, the probability of modified pixel values will be 
(P/2) for an embedding rate of P and the unmodified pixel values will be (1-P/2) after embedding 
process, which means that embedding each message bit needs 0.5 pixel values to be changed. In 
other words, it has an embedding efficiency of 2 bits of the secret message per one embedding 
change. Hence, the intensity histogram of the stego image could be estimated as follows: 
 hn = 1 − P2" h#n + P2 $h#n + 1   , n is evenh#n − 1   , n is odd  
 
Where n is a greyscale level which ranges from 0 to 255, and hn indicates the number of pixels 
in the image with greyscale value of n. 
 
This type of embedding, LSB replacement, leads to an imbalance distortion and produces ‘Pairs 
of Values’ on the intensity histogram of the stego image. Since LSB replacement is inherently 
asymmetric, current steganalysis methods can detect it easily[20], like: RS[21], SP[22], and 
WS[23,24]. 
 
 
 
Another way of analysing LSB embedding is the bit-level ENMPP, which is the expected number 
of bit modifications per pixel. This would be important too, as there are some steganalysis 
methods that can detect the existence of the secret message based on calculating several binary 
similarity measures between the 7th and 8th bit planes like[25]. Hence, an embedding process with 
less bit-level ENMPP would be better and less detectable by such detection methods. 
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The overall bit-level ENMPP for LSB replacement could be estimated by multiplying the 
probability of having mismatched LSBs, P+M, which is 0.5 by the number of bits that needs to 
be changed in each case, as shown below. 
 bit − level ENMPP = P+2M3 × no. of modi8ied bits bit − level ENMPP = 0.5 × 1 = 0.5   bits per message bits 
 
Hence, the overall bit-level ENMPP for LSB replacement is 0.5 bits for each bit of the secret 
message. 
 
5. ANALYSIS OF LSB MATCHING  
 
To analyse LSB matching steganography, we again consider the embedding process (with its 
embedding efficiency), its effect on the intensity histogram of the cover image, and bit-level 
ENMPP. 
 
LSB matching or ±1 embedding is a modified version of LSB replacement. Instead of simply 
replacing the LSB of the cover image, it randomly either adds or subtracts 1 from the cover image 
pixel value that has mismatched LSB with the secret message bit[26]. The possible pixel value 
transitions of ±1 embedding are shown in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Possible pixel value transitions with LSB matching 
 
The random increment or decrement in pixel values should maintain the boundary limitation and 
pixel values should always be between 0 and 255 [27]. In other words, the embedding process 
should neither subtract 1 from pixel values of 0 nor add 1 to the pixel values of 255. 
 
This random ±1 change to the mismatched LSB pixel values avoids the asymmetry changes to the 
cover image, which is the case with LSB replacement. Hence, LSB matching is considered harder 
to detect than LSB replacement[4]. The embedding procedure of LSB matching can be formally 
represented as follows[28]: 
P = P# + 1    , if b ≠ LSB(P#) and (K > 0 D P# = 0)     P# − 1    , if b ≠ LSB(P#) and (K < 0 D P# = 255)P#            , if b = LSB(P#)                                                  
 
Where K is an independent and identically distributed random variable with uniform distribution 
on F−1, +1G. 
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For the intensity histogram we consider an embedding rate of P. There is a chance of 50% that the 
clean image pixel value contains the desired LSB, which means that (P/2) of the cover pixel 
values will change after the embedding process. Hence, the estimated unmodified pixel values 
will be (1 − P/2) , which means that embedding each message bit needs 0.5 pixel values to be 
changed. In other words, its embedding efficiency is 2 bits of the secret message per one 
embedding change. The intensity histogram of the stego image could be obtained as follows[28]. 
 h(n) = 1 − P2" h#(n) + P4 Jh#(n + 1) + h#(n − 1)K 
 
As mentioned earlier, the LSB matching will avoid the asymmetric property in modifying the 
cover image. However, as claimed by[29], ±1 embedding is reduced to a low pass filtering of the 
intensity histogram. This implies that the cover histogram contains more high-frequency power 
than the histogram of the stego image [28], which offers an opportunity to steganalyzers to detect 
the existence of the secret message embedded with LSB matching. 
 
Apart from the supervised machine learning detectors of ±1 embedding like[30-33], which 
usually have problems in choosing an appropriate feature set and measuring classification error 
probabilities[34], the methods of detecting LSB matching steganography could be divided into 
two categories; the centre of mass of the histogram characteristic function (HCF) and the 
amplitude of local extrema (ALE)[35]. 
 
A number of detection methods have been proposed based on the centre of mass of the histogram 
characteristic function (HCF-COM) like Harmsen and Pearlman[36], which has better 
performance on RGB images than grey-scale. This method is modified and improved by Ker[27], 
who applied the HCF in two novel ways: using the down sampled image and computing the 
adjacency histogram. 
 
Based on the amplitude of local extrema (ALE), Zhang et al.[29] considered the sum of the 
amplitudes of all local extrema in the histogram to distinguish between stego and clean images. 
This method is improved by Cancelli et al. [32] after reducing the border effects noise in the 
histogram and extending it to the amplitude of local extrema in the 2D adjacency histogram. 
The bit-level ENMPP of LSB matching is also important and should be considered for the same 
reason, binary similarity measures. Since the probability of having mismatched LSB is also 50%, 
the bit-level ENMPP would be as follows: 
 bit − level ENMPP = P+2M3 × no. of modi8ied bits bit − level ENMPP = 0.5 × (≥ 1) bit − level ENMPP ≥ 0.5 (bits per message bits) 
 
Where P+ is the probability of having mismatched LSBs, which is 0.5. However, the number of 
modified bits would be more than 1, because of the random ±1 changes to the pixel values, as 
could be noted from the following examples: 
 
 
127 (0111111)2 + 1 = 128 (10000000)2    , 8-bits changed 
192 (11000000)2 - 1 = 191 (10111111)2   , 7-bits changed 
7 (00000111)2 + 1 = 8 (00001000)2          , 4-bits changed 
240 (11110000)2 - 1 = 239 (11101111)2   , 5-bits changed 
 
Hence, the overall bit-level ENMPP for LSB matching is expected to be more than or equal to 0.5 
bits for each bit of the secret message. 
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6. THE PROPOSED METHOD 
 
Based on highlighting the weakest part of both LSB replacement and ±1 embedding, in this 
section we propose a new method of LSB embedding to improve the embedding efficiency and 
reduce the probability of detection by current steganalysis methods. Moreover, the new proposed 
method should also minimize the bit-level ENMPP to the cover image after embedding. 
 
The new method, single mismatch LSB embedding (SMLSB), takes two bits of the secret 
message at a time and embeds them in a pair of selected pixel values of the cover image. The 
embedding method always assumes a single mismatch between the 2-bits of the secret message 
and the LSBs of the selected pair of pixel values. For each 2-bits of the secret message we 
consider two consecutive pixel values for simplicity. However, the selection could be based on 
other functions as well. 
 
Since the proposed method embeds 2-bits at a time, there are four cases of having match (M) or 
mismatch (M) between the LSBs of the selected two pixel values and the 2-bits of the secret 
message, as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
  
Figure 3. The possible cases of Match/ Mismatch 
 
As the embedding method always assumes a single mismatch (MM or MM) between pixel values 
and secret message bits, the 2nd LSB of the first pixel value should always refer to the index of the 
mismatch; 1 for MM and 0 for MM. If the case is MM, then it changes one of the LSBs according 
to 2nd LSB of the first pixel value. If the 2nd LSB value was 0, then it flips the LSB of the first 
pixel value to create MM. Otherwise, if it was 1, it flips the LSB of the second pixel value to 
create MM. For the MM case, the embedding will also change one of the LSBs according to 2nd 
LSB of the first pixel value. But this time, if the 2nd LSB was 0, then it flips the LSB of the 
second pixel value to create MM. Otherwise, if it was 1, it flips the LSB of the first pixel value to 
create MM. 
 
For the other two cases, MM and MM, the embedding will be done by changing the 2nd LSB of the 
first pixel value based on the index of the mismatch. If it was MM, then the 2nd LSB of the first 
pixel value will be set to 1. Otherwise, if it was MM, then the 2nd LSB value of the first pixel 
value will be set to 0. Hence, after each embedding there is only MM or MM with the right index 
in the 2nd LSB of the first pixel value. The embedding algorithm is shown in Figure . 
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Figure 4. The embedding algorithm of SMLSB embedding 
 
Table 1, shows some examples of the embedding process by the proposed method. 
 
Table 1. Examples of SMLSB embedding process. 
 
Clean pair of pixels Two message bits Stego pair of pixels 
xxxxxx01 
xxxxxxx1 
11 
xxxxxx00 
xxxxxxx1 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx0 
10 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx1 
xxxxxx01 
xxxxxxx1 
00 
xxxxxx01 
xxxxxxx0 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx0 
01 
xxxxxx10 
xxxxxxx0 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx0 
11 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx0 
xxxxxx01 
xxxxxxx1 
10 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx1 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx0 
01 
xxxxxx01 
xxxxxxx0 
xxxxxx00 
xxxxxxx0 
10 
xxxxxx00 
xxxxxxx0 
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7. ANALYSIS OF SMLSB EMBEDDING 
 
 
To analyse the proposed LSB embedding, just like other embedding methods mentioned earlier, 
we consider the embedding process itself (with its embedding efficiency), its effect on the 
intensity histogram of the image, and the bit-level ENMPP as well. 
 
SMLSB embedding modifies the pixel values based on the match/mismatch cases between LSBs 
of the selected two pixel values and the 2-bits of the secret message. As it uses the 2nd LSB of the 
first selected pixel value to refer to the index of the mismatch, it modifies the first pixel value 
differently from the second one in the selected pair of pixels. The embedding algorithm could be 
formulated in two separate forms as follows. 
 
MNO =
PQ
QQ
R
QQ
QSM
NO + 2    , 
 NO = 2MNO3 TUV NOWX ≠ 2MNOWX3 TUV 2YZ2MNO3 = 0            MNO − 2    , 
 NO ≠ 2MNO3 TUV NOWX = 2MNOWX3 TUV 2YZ2MNO3 = 1            MNO + 1    , 
 NO = [2MNO3 = 0\TUV NOWX = 2MNOWX3 TUV 2YZ2MNO3 = 0                   ]^ NO ≠ [2MNO3 = 0\ TUV NOWX ≠ 2MNOWX3 TUV 2YZ2MNO3 = 1MNO − 1    , 
 NO = [2MNO3 = 1\ TUV NOWX = 2MNOWX3 TUV 2YZ2MNO3 = 0                     ]^ NO ≠ [2MNO3 = 1\ TUV NOWX ≠ 2MNOWX3 TUV 2YZ2MNO3 = 1MNO           , ]_ℎDa
                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
MNOWX =
PQQ
R
QQSM
NOWX + 1 , 
 NO = 2MNO3 TUV NOWX = [2MNOWX3 = 0\ TUV 2YZ2MNO3 = 1                   ]^ NO ≠ 2MNO3 TUV NOWX ≠ [2MNOWX3 = 0\ TUV 2YZ2MNO3 = 0MNOWX − 1 , 
 NO = 2MNO3 TUV NOWX = [2MNOWX3 = 1\ TUV 2YZ2MNO3 = 1                   ]^ NO ≠ 2MNO3 TUV NOWX ≠ [2MNOWX3 = 1\ TUV 2YZ2MNO3 = 0MNOWX       , ]_ℎDa
                                                                                                                              
 
 
Where i is the index of the secret message bit. The pNb and p#Nb refer to the stego and clean 
pixel values respectively for the 2ith secret message bit embedding. The pNbWX and p#NbWX are 
again refer to the stego and clean pixel values used for embedding 2i+1th secret message bit. 
The possible pixel value changes with SMLSB embedding could be simplified by separating the 
first pNb and second pNbWX pixel values from the selected pair, as shown in Figure 5 and Figure 
6. 
 
Figure 5. Possible pixel value transitions for pNb with SMLSB embedding 
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Figure 6. Possible pixel value transitions for pNbWX with SMLSB embedding 
 
As could be noted from Figure  and Figure , the pixel value transitions of pNbWX are like LSB 
replacement. While pNb is more complicated and has more transitions between clean and stego 
pixel values. 
 
To analyse the impact of the SMLSB embedding on the intensity histogram, again we consider an 
embedding rate of P. Since the secret message is considered as a random sequence of 0 and 1, 
based on the fact that it will be close to its encrypted version [37], equal probabilities should be 
considered for match/mismatch cases. Hence, for each case of (MM, MM, MM, MM) the 
probability of occurrence would be 0.25. 
 
For MM and MM, the embedding process will change one of the two selected pixel values 
according to the 2nd LSB of the p#Nb to get either MM or MM. The change will be -1 or +1 for the 
odd and the even pixel values respectively. So, (P/4) of the pixel values will be modified by 
adding or subtracting 1 according to their values, even or odd values respectively. 
 
However, for MM and MM there is a probability of having 50% of the 2nd LSB of the p#Nb to have 
the desired value, which needs no change. The other 50% will be modified by flipping the 2nd 
LSB of the p#Nb only. In other word (P/8) of the pixel values will either incremented or 
decremented by 2 according to their 2nd LSB value. Hence, the remaining 1 − 3P/8 pixel 
values will stay unchanged after embedding the secret message with the embedding rate of P, 
which means that embedding each message bit needs 0.375 pixel values to be changed. This 
ENMPP, 0.375, is better than LSB replacement and LSB matching, which are 0.5 pixels per 
message bit. Hence, it improves the embedding efficiency from 2 to 8/3 bits per embedding 
change. The intensity histogram of the stego image could be estimated by the following: 
 
hn = 1 − 3P8 " h#n + P8 eh#n + 2   , if 2fg LSBn = 0h#n − 2   , if  2fg LSBn = 1 + P4 $h#n + 1   , n is evenh#n − 1   , n is odd  
 
Where, n is again the greys-cale level valued between 0 and 255. Both hn and h#n refer to 
the number of pixels in the stego and clean image respectively with the greyscale value of n. 
 
As only (P/4) of the pixel values are modified like LSB replacement, it is expected to effectively 
reduce the probability of detection with LSB replacement steganalysis methods. Also, it is 
expected to reduce the probability of detection by LSB matching steganalysis methods as well, 
based on the dissimilarity in pixel value transitions and its influence on the intensity histogram 
after embedding. 
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The bit-level ENMPP for the proposed method could be calculated based on the match/mismatch 
cases, in which equal probabilities are considered. 
 bit − level ENMPP = ∑P+[each case] × no. of modi8ied bits2  bit − level ENMPP = P+MM × 1 + P+2MM3 × 0.5 + P+2MM3 × 0.5 + P+2MM3 × 12  bit − level ENMPP = 0.25 × 1 + 0.25 × 0.5 + 0.25 × 0.5 + 0.25 × 12  bit − level ENMPP = 0.752 = 0.375   bits per message bit 
 
The bit-level ENMPP is divided by two, as it embeds two bits of the secret message at a time. In 
this case the overall bit-level ENMPP for the proposed method will be 0.375 bits per message bit. 
Hence, the proposed method will result in fewer bit-level changes to the cover image after 
embedding the same amount of secret message. 
 
8. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
 
To make the experimental results more reliable, two sets of images are considered. The first set is 
3000 images from ASIRRA (Animal Species Image Recognition for Restricting Access) public 
corpus pet images from Microsoft research website[38], which are random with different sizes, 
compression rates, texture ...etc. The other group is a set of 3000 never compressed images from 
Sam Houston state university – Multimedia Forensics Group image database [39]. Both sets are 
used after converting them into grey-scale images. 
 
To check the efficiency of the proposed LSB embedding, both detection methods are considered; 
the LSB replacement and LSB matching steganalysis methods. In all experiments, streams of 
pseudo random bits are considered as a secret message. This is due to the fact that it will have all 
statistical properties of encrypted version of the secret message according to[40]. Also, to 
eliminate the effect of choosing the embedding place (random or sequential embedding), the 
embedding rate of 1 bit per pixel (i.e. the images’ total capacity) is considered. Then it is tested 
against both LSB replacement and matching steganalysis methods as shown in the following 
sections. 
 
8.1 SMLSB against LSB replacement steganalysis methods 
 
There are many methods for detecting LSB replacement steganography in the literature, this 
paper considers two structural steganalysis methods, the Sample Pair (SP) analysis[41] and 
Weighted Stego (WS)[24]. As mentioned earlier, for each case, the image is loaded with the 
maximum capacity of the random secret message twice; one with LSB replacement and the other 
with SMLSB embedding. 
 
The experimental results showed that the proposed method effectively reduce the probability of 
detection for both detection methods over both sets of images compared to LSB replacement, as 
shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2. The o
Image set 
ASIRRA 
Uncompressed 
ASIRRA 
Uncompressed 
 
Also, there is a noticeable reduction in 
the LSB replacement by SMLSB embedding as shown in 
 
Figure 7. The probability of detection vs. detection threshold for ASIRRA images with WS.
 
Figure 8. The probability of detection vs. detection threshold for uncompressed images with WS.
Figure 9. The probability of detection vs. detection threshold for ASIRRA images with SP.
 
logy (CS & IT) 
verall reduction rates in probability of detection. 
Detection method The overall reduction in probability of detection 
WS 46.5% 
WS 48.4% 
SP 30.9% 
SP 39.8% 
probability of detection for the threshold values that suits 
Figures 7-10. 
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Figure 10. The probability of detection vs. detection threshold for uncompressed images with SP.
 
8.2 SMLSB against LSB matching steganalysis m
 
As mentioned earlier, there are two main categories of LSB matching steganalysis methods. In 
this paper we use one detection method in each category. For the centre of mass of the histogram 
characteristic function (HCF-COM) we used Ker’s method in
extrema we used the method proposed by Zhang et al.
 
The proposed method, SMLSB, o
embedding methods in terms of detection. Figures 11
images with two different detection methods.
ALE based steganalysis method is no more than a random classifier for the stego images 
embedded with SMLSB. Also, the performance of the HCF
considerably reduced by applying the SMLSB embedding method, as shown in Figures 13 and 
14. 
 
Figure 11. ROC graph of ALE steganalysis for LSB matching, LSB matching revisited
 
                                   
 
ethods 
[27], and for the amplitude of local 
[29]. 
utperforms both LSB matching and LSB matching revisited 
-14, show the ROC graph for each group of 
 As could be noticed from Figures 11 and 12, the 
-COM based steganalysis method is 
 
, and
ASIRRA images. 
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[4] 
 SMLSB for 
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Figure 12. ROC graph of ALE steganalysis for LSB matching, LSB matching revisited
 
Figure 13. ROC graph of HCF-COM steganalysis for LSB matching, LSB matching revisited
 
Figure 14. ROC graph of HCF-COM steganalysis for LSB matching, LSB matching revisited
Like any other steganography methods, the SMLSB cannot avoid all limitations and cannot 
totally defeat the detection methods. As could be noticed from 
possible to entirely avoid the detection. Also, there is another weak
quality measurement PSNR (Peak Signal to Noise Ratio)
The proposed method results in a slightl
LSB matching and LSB matching revisited
lower limit value of PSNR (38 dB) 
 
logy (CS & IT) 
 
, and
Uncompressed images. 
 
for ASIRRA images. 
 
for Uncompressed images. 
 
Table 2 and Figures 7
ness regarding
 between the cover and a stego image. 
y lower PSNR than other methods; LSB replacement, 
, which is imperceptible and still very far from the 
according to [42, 43]. 
 SMLSB for 
, and SMLSB 
, and SMLSB 
-14, it is not 
 the image 
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Table 3 shows the PSNR values for some standard images after embedding random binary 
streams with a maximum capacity using different embedding methods. 
 
Table 13. PSNR values vs. embedding methods. 
 
Images LSB Replacement LSB Matching LSB Matching Revisited 
SMLS
B 
Lena 50.88 50.88 52.13 49.12 
Pepper 50.17 50.17 51.41 48.42 
Baboon 50.28 50.28 51.53 48.52 
 
9. EXTRACTION PROCESS 
 
The extraction process is very simple, let sXsN denote the least significant bits of the first and 
second selected pixel values respectively. It looks at the 2nd LSB of the first pixel value in the pair 
of pixels. If it is 0, then the LSBs of the pair of pixels would be extracted in the form of sXk sN as 
two secret message bits, since, in this case, the mismatched LSB is in the first pixel value. If, on 
the other hand, it is 1, then it takes sXsNk  as an extracted message bits. Table 4, shows all different 
cases of extraction process. 
 
Table 4. The extraction process. 
The stego images pixel pair Extracted message bits llllll0X lllllllN Xk N llllll1X lllllllN XNk  
 
Table 5, shows some examples of message bits extracted from stego pixel values. 
 
Table 5. Examples of SMLSB extraction process. 
The stego images pixel pair Extracted message bits 
xxxxxx01 
xxxxxxx1 01 
xxxxxx00 
xxxxxxx1 11 
xxxxxx11 
xxxxxxx1 10 
xxxxxx10 
xxxxxxx1 00 
 
10. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we have shown that the proposed SMLSB method can improve the embedding 
efficiency in compare to LSB replacement and LSB matching from 2 to 8/3 and reduce the 
probability of detection by the two LSB steganalysis methods; LSB replacement and LSB 
matching. It also leaves a higher rate of pixel values unchanged for embedding the same amount 
of secret messages compared with other two LSB steganography methods. Moreover, the 
proposed method outperforms the LSB matching revisited, which has the same embedding 
efficiency, in terms of detection. Also, it can be applied to any pixel without restricting the 
saturated values (0 and 255). All embedding methods are analysed in detail including SMLSB 
and highlighted the cause of reducing the probability of detection. As could be noticed, the 
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proposed method is very simple to implement with no complex calculation, less bit-level ENMPP 
on the cover image, and no reduction in the embedding capacity compared to other two LSB 
steganography methods, LSB replacement and LSB matching. 
 
Finally, reducing the probability of detection by LSB replacement steganalysis methods is limited 
and the new method cannot totally avoid it. Also, it results in slightly more distortion in 
comparison to LSB replacement and LSB matching methods. As future work, it might be possible 
to modify the proposed method to give lower probability of detection and lower ENMPP for the 
same message length. 
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